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Fair Use v. Fair Access 
Randal C. Picker* 
 
I want to make four points. 
1. The copyright act defines use rights, not access rights. 
That overstates slightly—especially with the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act in the statute—but the core of 
copyright law addresses how works can be used assuming 
that legal access has been obtained. Other law addresses 
the circumstances under which works can be accessed. 
2. Nothing in copyright itself suggests that use rights should 
trump access rights; indeed, our core access principles 
suggest just the opposite. We frequently speak of a fair use 
“right.” I am doubtful about that on its own terms but 
even if we find something there, a fair use right isn’t an 
access right. Fair use doesn’t equal fair access. 
3. The scope of rights given to an initial author will effect the 
timing and scope of investment she will make in creating a 
work. For many works, those investments can be made in 
discrete lumps. As a society, we want investments to be 
made incrementally rather than as one large lump as doing 
so allows us to get feedback from the market on the value 
of a work. We don’t want to throw good money after bad, 
and if we learn that, say, the English version of a work is a 
failure, we don’t want to bother translating it into 
Mandarin. Plus we will delay the time that works reach the 
market if we create an incentive to do large, lumpy 
investments rather than a sequence of investments coupled 
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with market feedback. Authors start with one monopoly: 
their unique access to the work that they have created. If 
we do not give authors control over these follow-on works, 
authors will overinvest upfront in the works, since that is 
the only way that the can gain a return on their initial 
monopoly over access to the work. In that situation, we are 
better off to hand the author a statutory monopoly over 
the follow-on work rather than see the author invest real 
resources in creating a property right over that work. 
4. Fair use is a form of rights bundling. If we decide that, say, 
format-shifting is fair use or is otherwise a permitted use—
you sell me a music CD and I have a use right to make a 
personal copy on a cassette or my iPod—we are making a 
decision about the rights that we are bundling together. 
The nature of bundles is that everyone gets stuck buying 
the same set of rights. These bundles can be inefficiently 
large. Consumers would often be better off if instead we 
allowed rights to be unbundled, so that consumers could 
buy just those rights that they wanted rather than being 
forced to take unwanted rights. Doing that requires a 
narrow conception of fair use. 
I .  C o p y r i g h t  M a g i c :  A c c e s s  a n d  U s e  
When I talk to a new group about copyright, I usually feel as if I am 
performing a magic act. I start by asking the audience for a blank 
piece of paper. I then ask for the piece of paper as a gift, so that 
ownership of the paper transfers to me. With that work done, I then 
compose a poem live, usually an ode to some object in the room or a 
current event. Four or five lines of epically bad poetry but a poem 
nonetheless, and I then ask the question of interest: do I have a 
copyrighted work? I then talk quickly through Sec 102 of the 
Copyright Act. That requires, of course, an original work of 
authorship—the poem that I just made up—fixed in a tangible 
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medium of expression—the writing on the paper. The copyright 
“equation” as I think of it: OWA + F + TME = ©. 
I emphasize that unlike the patent system, copyright doesn’t filter 
for quality. There is no requirement that the poem be good enough 
to get a copyright. It can be a very, very bad poem—it always is—and 
yet it still enjoys all of the benefits of copyright. There is also no 
requirement that I first present the poem to a government official 
before I can receive rights in the poem, though I do mention the 
benefits of registration. This is the core of our current scheme of 
copyright: it arises on fixation, at the very instant that I write the 
poem on paper. 
I then turn to the distinction between use and access. When I 
hold a blank piece of paper in my hands, I think that we have a pretty 
good understanding of my ownership rights in that paper under 
applicable state property law. I control access to the paper; third 
parties have no right to access the paper. What changes when I write 
a poem on the paper? In the language of the statute, copyright 
subsists at that point, but the fact that copyright status has attached 
doesn’t change our prior rules that applied when the paper was blank. 
I continue to control the paper and through that access to the work. 
Third parties have no right to access to the paper, no right to insist 
that I publish the work and somehow make it available to everyone. 
I then continue the hypothetical. I take the poem home and put 
it in my desk. A deranged student wants to blog about my poem, so 
he breaks into my house, rifles through my desk, and then copies one 
line from the poem on a piece of paper he brought with him. He 
then goes home and blogs about the poem and quotes the line he 
copied before. He then gets arrested for breaking and entering into 
my house. Where does that put us? 
That is the distinction between use and access. We should start 
with the big picture: traditional copyright is about use of works, it 
doesn’t establish rights about access to works. The copyright act 
defines allowed and disallowed uses of works but it doesn’t create 
Picker Fair Use v. Fair Access 
3/3/2008  Page 4 
access rights or otherwise regulate controls over access. This overstates 
somewhat, especially as more stuff has been dumped into the statute. 
The 1996 Digital Millennium Copyright Act is codified in title 17, 
the copyright title and it is very much about rules of access to 
copyrighted works, but it also is a very non-traditional “copyright” 
statute. With the addition of the DMCA, the statute now validates 
certain controls on access, but the core notion that the copyright act 
itself doesn’t confer access rights hasn’t changed. The core copyright 
laws lay out rights regarding uses of a copyrighted work—the right to 
copy a work or to distribute it or to perform it in public—or the right 
to engage in certain fair uses of a work given access, but nothing in 
copyright creates a right to access to the work in the first place. And 
you can’t engage in fair use of the work if you don’t have access to it. 
The copyright act defines a complex set of use rights, conditioned 
on access. The copyright holder controls uses, set forth mainly in 
Section 106, and if someone uses a copyrighted work and violates 
those rights, we call that infringement and that in turn gives rise to 
the remedies set forth in the statute. But in defining the uses of the 
work controlled by the copyright holder, we have also established a 
group of uses that will not trigger that remedy regime. The Section 
106 rights are limited by additional sections of the statute, including, 
for our purposes here, the uses considered fair under Section 107. 
Note the language just used, as I think it is important to be 
precise in the framing of Section 107. All Section 107 does is provide 
that certain uses that otherwise would be infringing will not be 
infringing, meaning that the remedies that copyright creates won’t 
apply through copyright. This isn’t some broad “right” to fair use 
though fair use is often addressed in those terms (and I have been 
guilty of that in the past). Section 107 simply says that the remedies 
that would otherwise attach under copyright if certain uses took place 
will not be available. Copyright remedies won’t be available through 
copyright law for the uses, but it doesn’t say anything about whether 
the uses that won’t be treated as infringing copyright somehow 
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violate other applicable law—for example, defamation law or the law 
of obscenity—or whether remedies like, but not equivalent, to those 
in copyright could be imposed through some source other than 
copyright (such as contract). Section 107 on its own does not provide 
any protection for those uses under any other applicable law. It does 
not call off contract law or tort law or obscenity law or any other 
another host of laws that might be triggered by a use that qualifies as 
fair. If the copyright statute is going to do that we’ll have to look 
elsewhere. And Section 107, like the rest of traditional copyright law 
(pre-DMCA law), says nothing about access rights. 
But the copyright act’s focus on use and inattention to access may 
just reflect the assumption that authors want to publish work and not 
hide it and the natural instinct to publish creates access to the work. 
An author can create a work and then never let it see the light of day, 
but if an author wants to be read, she has to release the work. The 
necessity of release means that that the natural desire of an author to 
be read will create some means of access and that in turn will create 
the possibility of use and then fair use. Indeed, it once was the case 
that the act of taking content public—publication in a word—
necessarily resulted in an object that someone could use. I could not 
distribute the work generally and retain control over it. If I wanted to 
maintain full control, I had to keep the work to myself. 
I I .  C o n t r o l  a t  a  D i s t a n c e :  L e g e n d s ,  C o n t r a c t s  a n d  
T e c h n o l o g y  
What rules should apply concerning control and publication? 
Authors will seek to exercise control over a copy of a work even after 
it has been published. Until recently, authors relied mainly on 
legends and contracts to attempt to exercise control over works after 
they had been widely distributed. Copyright aficionados will quickly 
recall the legends addressing retail sales prices of books in Bobbs-
Merrill and barring radio use of LPs in Whiteman.1 Legends are the 
                                                 
1 Bobbs-Merrill Co v Straus, 210 US 339 (1908); RCA Mfg. Co Inc v Whiteman, 114 
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easiest technology to allow control at a distance. Until recently, actual 
technological controls were impossible and that is still true today for 
works published on paper (newspapers, magazines and paper is still 
the dominant method for accessing books). Actual contracts with 
consumers are pretty clumsy for most mass produced copyrighted 
works (printed works again and music and video distributed on CDs 
and DVDs), though the shift to digital distribution of works through 
downloading makes click-thru contracting with individual consumers 
much more plausible. 
Focus on the way in which we might regulate three instruments 
for controlling published works: legends, contracts and technology. 
Each of these tools might allow for control at a distance over a 
published work. Start with legends and revisit the classics to make 
sure that we understand their boundaries. In 1904, Bobbs-Merrill 
published Hallie Erminie Rives’s book The Castaway, a story of “three 
great men ruined in one year—a king, a cad and a castaway.” You can 
buy a new copy today on Amazon for $38.65 or an original in the 
used-book market for substantially less. But in 1904, Bobbs-Merrill 
wanted to make sure that it sold at retail for a $1.00, and just below 
the copyright notice, Bobbs-Merrill added the following legend: “The 
price of this book at retail is One Dollar net. No dealer is licensed to 
sell at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as 
infringement of the copyright.”2 The second sentence is the 
interesting one. Does the first clause attempt to create some sort of 
license or contract regarding the sale of the book? Or does it purport 
to describe a state of affairs created by a separate contract somewhere 
else? The second clause seems to be a claim about how copyright 
applied to the situation. 
                                                                                                             
F2d 86 (1940). 
2 See the legend in Google Book Search (online at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=C0c1AAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=editions:IS
BN1417935715#PPP14,M1 (visited on Mar 2 2008). 
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And a claim that turned out to be wrong. Macy’s had been selling 
The Castaway for 89 cents, and for 11 cents a copy, Bobbs-Merrill 
went to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ultimately 
understood the case to be a narrow one. The then-current copyright 
statute gave the copyright holder the sole right to “vend” a book: did 
that right make it possible for a subsequent sale of the book to be 
infringing when the copyright owner had voluntarily sold the book in 
the first place, even if the copyright holder included a legend of the 
sort set out above and a purchaser like Macy’s knew of the legend? 
The Court held that Congress didn’t intend for the statutory 
copyright to stretch that far. But the decision is just as important for 
what it doesn’t say: the Court repeatedly emphasized that there was 
no claim of contract in the case, that the issue was one purely of the 
reach of the copyright statute on its own.3 
Consider Whiteman next. RCA was producing phonographs of 
Whiteman’s orchestra and selling those to the public. Radio 
broadcasters bought the records and played them over the air. RCA 
wanted to block that use, or, more likely, charge a separate price for 
it. RCA sought to unbundle the uses otherwise embedded in the 
physical record with the goal of implementing some form of price 
discrimination, charging one price to ordinary consumers who played 
the records at home and a second higher price for radio broadcasters. 
RCA implemented its uses restriction through legends on the LPs and 
the envelopes that came in and through contracts with its sellers.4 
                                                 
3 “We do not think that the statute can be given such a construction, and it is to be 
remembered that this is purely a question of statutory construction. There is no claim in this 
case of contract limitation, nor license agreement controlling the subsequent sales of the 
book.” Bobbs-Merrill, 210 US at 350. Earlier in the opinion, the Court noted that “[t]he 
learned counsel for the appellant in this case, in the argument at bar, disclaims relief because 
of any contract, and relies solely upon the copyright statutes, and rights therein conferred.” 
Id at 346. 
4 Online at http://bixography.com/images/dardanellareissuelabel.jpg (visited Mar 2 
2008). 
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The Second Circuit, through Learned Hand, overturned the 
restrictions. Whiteman was premised on an opt-in, quid-pro-quo 
vision of copyright. It started with the general premise that 
restrictions on chattels are prima facie invalid. It cited nothing for 
that proposition though it would have been easy enough to fill in 
turn-of-the-century cases such as Bobbs-Merrill in copyright and Dr. 
Miles in antitrust, and Dr. Miles had traced the proposition back to 
Coke on Littleton in 1628. But whatever the status of the general 
proposition, according to Hand, federal copyright law was organized 
around a more specific premise: temporary monopoly in exchange for 
dedication. Copyright creators chose to bring their works within the 
Copyright Act created by Congress and thereby received a defined 
monopoly in their works. Once that monopoly expired, the works 
were dedicated to the public and no restriction could prevent that 
dedication. Yes, the records were themselves not registrable under the 
Copyright Act, but it would be “contrary to the whole policy of the 
Copyright Act and of the Constitution” to allow the legends to 
protect these inferior copyright objects when legends couldn’t protect 
works that enjoyed full federal copyright protections. 
Hand then turned to the “much discussed” International News 
Service v. Associated Press.5 He had little use for it, seeing it as largely 
limited to its facts. Hand instead focused on the premise—and it was 
nothing more than that as he cited no sources—that an author had 
no natural rights and was “not free to make his own terms with the 
public.” Hand focused squarely on the issue of continuing control 
after general distribution: “there is nothing to justify a priori any 
continuance of their control over the activities of the public to which 
they have seen fit to dedicate the larger part of their contribution.” 
Hand offers no sense of why when we turn to copyrighted works 
we should depart from our baseline regime of free contracting in the 
sale of goods and services. He certainly doesn’t spend any time 
                                                 
5 248 US 215 (1918). 
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considering whether we might want to allow price discrimination in 
the sales of records in different markets.6 Looking at the subsequent 
contract cases gives some sense of this. Start with doctrine: the critical 
issue is the interaction of contracts with copyright’s preemption 
provision, set forth in Section 301 of the statute.7 That section 
preempts equivalent rights under state common law or state statutes. 
The courts haven’t always found this provision easy to apply but the 
majority of courts look for an “extra” element beyond items that 
always would arise with copyright and a contract has typically, 
though not always, qualified.8 
ProCD, an early and influential case in the pro-contracts camp, 
offers a good example of the utility of contractual use limitations and 
goes exactly to the sort of price discrimination that Hand didn’t 
consider in Whiteman.9 ProCD put together a computer database of 
more than 3,000 telephone directories. Hard work, to be sure, but, as 
we know, quite probably not copyrightable under Feist.10 ProCD 
wanted to offer multiple versions of the database, one to the 
commercial market and a second to the consumer market. This sort 
of versioning is quite common with copyrighted works and databases 
and clearly can be useful. Absent the ability to separate markets, 
ProCD might have only sold a high-priced version to commercial 
users, and consumers would have been out of luck. Consumers can 
                                                 
6 I have made this point before in explaining why price discrimination might be useful 
in these markets. See Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of 
Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U Chi L Rev 281 (2003). 
7 17 USC § 301. 
8 See eg Altera Corp v Clear Logic, Inc, 424 F3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir 2005) (collecting 
cases and concluding that “[m]ost courts have held that the Copyright Act does not preempt 
the enforcement of contractual rights”). For a more skeptical view, see Ritchie v Williams, 
395 F3d 283, 287-88 n 3 (6th Cir 2005) (noting the difficulty of applying the extra elements 
test). 
9 ProCD Inc v Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996). 
10 Feist Publications Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co Inc, 499 US 340 (1991). 
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gain access to the database at a favorable price, if—and this is the big 
if—ProCD could keep the two markets at a distance successfully. 
ProCD relied on contract to do that. Given the problems with 
copyrighting the database itself, it needed to use contract, but even if 
the underlying work had been copyrightable, ProCD would have 
needed a contract to separate uses of the work across markets. The 
standard rights of the copyright holder under Section 106 don’t, for 
example, make it possible for the copyright holder to claim that a 
particular commercial use is copyright infringement. Section 106 
doesn’t say anything general about separating commercial and 
consumer uses, and that it what ProCD wanted to do. Judge 
Easterbrook well understood all of that and read Section 301 as not 
barring the licenses in use in ProCD. 
We also should consider how the First Amendment interacts with 
this sort of contracting. Cohen v. Cowles Media Company may be the 
leading decision on how our ordinary contracting regime intersects 
with the First Amendment.11 Cohen holds that the First Amendment 
itself does not operate to limit the general applicability of contracts or 
other laws. In the midst of the 1982 Minnesota race for governor, 
Dan Cohen approached two newspapers in the Twin Cities to dish 
some dirt on one of the candidates. Cohen offered to provide the 
information on the condition that the newspapers didn’t disclose his 
identity. When they did, Cohen was immediately fired. Cohen sued 
the newspapers alleging, among other things, breach of contract and a 
jury returned a verdict in his favor of $200,000 in compensatory 
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. But the Minnesota 
Supreme Court believed that result was inconsistent with the rights of 
the newspapers under the First Amendment and it overturned the 
verdict. 
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. “Generally 
applicable laws” said the Court, did “not offend the First 
                                                 
11 501 US 663 (1991). 
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Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has 
incidental effects on the ability to gather and report the news.”12 The 
Court noted that “the press may not with impunity break and enter 
an office or dwelling to gather news” and that “we conclude that the 
First Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right 
to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state 
law.”13 In the case at bar, the applicable Minnesota law did no more 
than enforce promises voluntarily made, and the press could control 
these obligations by not making the promises in the first place. 
Although the Court didn’t say this, this also seems like a situation 
where the press wants the promise to be unenforceable only after the 
fact. If the press can’t meaningfully promise confidentiality to 
sources, it will almost certainly lose access to many stories. Cohen was 
a 5-4 case and the Court doesn’t have a well-developed caselaw on the 
interaction of the First Amendment and contract. But Cohen clearly 
rejects the notion that there is a flat inconsistency between contract 
and the First Amendment.14 As the breaking-and-entering example 
suggests, Cohen is premised on the notion that the ordinary 
underlying rules of property control access. 
Unlike both copyright and legends, contracts operate one by one. 
Copyright arises through status and is good against the world. 
Legends could operate that way as well, but as Bobbs-Merrill and 
Whiteman suggests, courts have been unwilling to allow legends to 
operate fully. Given those problems with contracts and legends, a 
better technology for enforcing use restrictions would be quite 
attractive and copyright holders have turned to technology itself to 
implement use and access restrictions. The topic of digital rights 
management and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is obviously 
                                                 
12 Id at 669. 
13 Respectively, id and id at 672. 
14 Note also that the Court doesn’t address the interaction of copyright and contract in 
Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003). 
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a large one15 and it would be silly to try to do a full discussion, so I 
will focus on one key point. 
DRM—or, if you prefer, technological protection measures 
(TPM)—is precisely about the question of whether we will allow 
authors to exercise control at distance over works that they wish to 
distribute more generally. Recall where we started this discussion. 
Authors can maintain full control over a work by never distributing it 
in the first place. That is a high price to pay, and, in the past, 
publication of the work created access and the possibility of use 
followed. If contracts and legends were too cumbersome or blocked 
by the courts, authors would lose control through publication. 
DRM changes that. DRM makes possible control at distance, 
meaning that an author can distribute a work generally and yet still 
exercise control over how the work is used. To be sure, that operates 
well only for works that are intermediated through technology. The 
morning newspapers that shows up on the stoop of my house can’t be 
shrinkwrapped (actually, of course, it arrives wrapped in plastic to 
keep it dry, but I usually successfully get beyond the plastic). Works 
delivered on paper are still published as they always have been. But 
works that are intermediated by technology—music and video and 
increasing text—those are works as to which the possibility of control 
at distance exists and that puts the utility or disutility of that control 
squarely on the table. 
I I I .  A c c e s s  a n d  U s e  R e g i m e s  
Return to my earlier hypothetical involving my new poem and the 
deranged student who breaks into my house to copy it. Where do we 
stand when the cops catch the student? Does she go to jail for 
                                                 
15 There is a large literature and almost an infinite number of works could be cited 
though I remain unsurprisingly partial to my own contributions. For those, see Randal C. 
Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts, in François 
Lévêque and Howard Shelanski, eds, Antitrust, Patents and Copyright: EU and US Perspectives 
180 (Edward Elgar 2005) and Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management, 5 
J Telecomms & High Tech L 47 (2006). 
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breaking and entering? Can I sue her for copyright infringement? 
Again, we need to distinguish use and access. Section 107 of the 
Copyright Act addresses fair use and all it does is pull certain uses out 
of the general infringement regime created by copyright law, meaning 
that if you do one of those uses, you can’t be held liable for copyright 
infringement. By itself, section 107 doesn’t create an independent 
right of access to works and doesn’t limit the ability of a copyright 
holder to condition access to the work. Limits on those conditions 
will have to be found elsewhere, if anywhere. 
I can readily imagine three possibilities as to how use and access 
should interact: 
1. Full Separation. Use and access are separate questions. Your 
right to use the material doesn’t turn on how you obtained access. It 
is what it is independent of how you got access. If a book review of a 
book borrowed from the library would be fair use, so would a review 
of a review of the same book obtained via a burglary of the library. 
But, more independence, your immunity to use the material if you 
have access also doesn’t change your right to gain access to the 
material. If stealing the book is a crime, you don’t get off the hook by 
saying that the use that you made of the book was a fair use. So the 
state would a criminal action for burglary, but the burglary wouldn’t 
create an action for copyright infringement where one wouldn’t 
otherwise exist. 
2. Fair-Use Penalties. I could imagine a regime of fair use 
penalties, meaning that we take into account how access was obtained 
and limit usual fair use because of the way in which access was 
obtained. A use that would usually be fair—a book review—would 
lose that status if the book was stolen. The state gets to put the 
burglar in jail for the theft and the author can sue for copyright 
infringement. 
3. Fair-Use Trumps. The flipside of fair use penalties would be 
fair use trumps: we use the fact that the use would not be copyright 
infringement because it would be fair to trump the punishment that 
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could attach to the method used to acquire access. The book review 
would insulate the burglar from prosecution because the book review 
was fair use. 
I am quite skeptical about the role for regime 3. Once it was 
announced, burglars would go into blogging in a big way: steal stuff, 
be sure to take a book as well, and then blog a review of the book. 
Presumably a fair-use trump regime would apply only to stolen 
copyrighted works, but even there, I am hard-pressed to understand 
why we should twist fair use so as to vindicate theft. I could go either 
way on 1 or 2, but regime 3 effectively converts a particular copyright 
privilege into something much, much broader. I suspect that the 
caselaw puts us in cases 1 or 2; I doubt that we are even close to 
regime 3.16 
What cases might fall within my third situation? The library 
burglary obviously, but that is the most extreme version. Consider 
two other situations: (1) contractual access limits and (2) digital 
rights management technologies. I give you access to the manuscript 
of my poem but I make you promise not to post a review on your 
blog. You breach the promise. Do I have an action in contract? 
Copyright infringement? What is the interaction between the two? 
The case against enforcing the contract would focus on the third-
party benefits of fair use. Fair use benefits not merely the person 
making the use, but also those who are exposed to the use. The book 
review isn’t so much about the reviewer as the potential audience for 
the book. A recipient of the manuscript who agrees to contractual 
limits on use might not take into account fully the third-party 
benefits associated with not being subject to the limits. If you 
thought that the author would grant access even without the 
contractual limit, we would be better off barring the enforcement of 
the contractual term. 
                                                 
16 Bill Patry lays out some of the relevant caselaw in a post on his blog. See Fair Use: 
The Source Copy (Dec 20, 2005), online at http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/12/fair-
use-source-copy.html. 
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Of course, the key premise there is that the author would give 
access to the work even without the contract limiting use. The 
Supreme Court was certainly skeptical about that in Cohen. It saw 
promises to sources as a key way that reporters would get stories in 
the first place and understood that the press as a whole would be 
worse off if it couldn’t make meaningful upfront promises to sources. 
And even putting to one side the empirical judgments required, I am 
skeptical that Section 107 itself, read fairly, says anything about 
contracts limiting uses. As suggested before, Section 107 just excludes 
certain uses from copyright’s rules regarding infringement. 
The leading caselaw discussion of the DRM question is probably 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Courley.17 Courley contended that the 
DMCA meant—in particular, Section 1201(c)(1)—that DRM 
schemes could be circumvented if that would allow fair use of the 
materials. The Second Circuit rejected that, but also concluded that 
the fact that fair use resulted from a breach of the DMCA didn’t 
somehow render that use unfair.18 This is to embrace the full 
independence view. 
I’m not sure that I agree with the Second Circuit that Section 
1201(c)(1) adopts full independence. The section says that 1201 itself 
isn’t intended to change the usual rules regarding copyright 
infringement, including the fair use rule. As I have suggested above, 
fair use addresses use, not access. The fair-use penalty idea is a within-
in fair use doctrine, a fair use version of clean hands, where fair use is 
forfeited if access is obtained illegitimately. I wouldn’t understand 
Section 1201(c)(1) to limit a judge from applying this version of the 
cleans hand doctrine to what would otherwise be a fair use. 
                                                 
17 273 F3d 429 (2nd Cir 2001) 
18 “Subsection 1201(c)(1) ensures that the DMCA is not read to prohibit the ‘fair use’ 
of information just because that information was obtained in a manner made illegal by the 
DMCA.” Id at 443. 
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I V .  B u i l d i n g  o n  C op y r i g h t e d  W o r k s  
At its core, the fair use question is about the circumstances under 
which a subsequent individual can use the prior work of a second 
author. This is often part of the general case in which a first work is 
used to create a second work. Take a simple case: I write a novel in 
English and the question is whether to translate the novel into 
Mandarin. As the author, I can make this decision before or after the 
novel is first published. We should think of this as case of 
incremental investment. I spend some amount to create the novel in 
English and then face a separate second and discrete investment 
question. 
In setting up our copyright system in the face of this sort of 
sequenced investment, we should take into account the way that new 
information should influence that investment decision. Put simply, 
we don’t want bad English novels translated into Mandarin, and we 
can a run a market test to figure out which novels should and 
shouldn’t be translated: publish the book in its original English and 
see how the public reacts. If they love it, translate it into Mandarin, 
but if everyone hates the novel, don’t bother spending money to 
create the Mandarin version. Take advantage of the information that 
we know will be forthcoming to make the second-stage investment 
decision. 
How do the rules of copyright influence this? If as author I don’t 
hold a translation right—if anyone with access to the English work 
can legally translate the work—I won’t get any value in the second 
round of value that arises from my original work. That might mean 
that I don’t create the work in the first place if I need access to some 
chunk of both pots of money created by the work—the original 
English sales and the subsequent Mandarin sales—but the more 
standard incentives-to-create issue isn’t my focus right now. Instead, 
focus on my incentive to translate the novel into Mandarin before it is 
published in English. Being first to market with the Mandarin 
version may be the way in which I grab some of the second stream of 
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value that results from the work. Note also that doing this means that 
I will almost certainly delay the release of the original English work 
while I take time to do the Mandarin translation. That delay is a 
social cost too. 
We can now say something sharp about the incentives of first 
authors to make these second-stage investments. Absent a property 
right over translations, authors will overinvest—compared to what we 
as a society want—in these second-stage investments. As a society, we 
should wait for the English sale results before investing in Mandarin, 
but, absent a translation property right, the first author won’t get any 
value from the Mandarin version if she waits for results. Instead, she 
will take advantage of her initial monopoly over access to the book to 
try to turn that into a first-mover advantage in the Mandarin market. 
Note how copyright can influence this. If she holds a translation 
right, then she can wait for the market returns. She doesn’t fear that 
giving up her initial unique access to the work will turn into a market 
disadvantage in the subsequent Mandarin competition. With a 
translation property right in hand, the author will now share the 
social incentive in using the market-value information efficiently. 
Now focus on the social trade-off in deciding whether to give the 
first author a property right over translations. Giving the author a 
monopoly means that we suffer the deadweight loss of monopoly for 
the work in the Mandarin market. The price of the Mandarin edition 
is higher than it would be absent the property right and some 
consumers never buy the work who otherwise would if the work were 
sold in free competition. The size of that effect depends of course on 
how the Mandarin work competes will all other Mandarin texts, so 
the monopoly power costs could be large or small. Against those costs 
we have to weigh the wasted investments that authors will make in 
translating bad books so as to take advantage of their initial 
monopoly over access to the text. And, to come back to the more 
conventional incentive story of copyright, the possible loss of original 
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works if author wouldn’t create the work at all without access to both 
markets. 
There has been a suggestion that we should frame fair use simply 
as any use that creates additional value for the work.19 I am not clear 
on how that notion would apply to my translation example. In some 
basic way, a translation of a work doesn’t compete with the original 
work. Mandarin-only readers aren’t going to buy the English version 
of the novel, and so the Mandarin translation isn’t a meaningful 
substitute for the English version; it complements it. There will only 
be a handful of readers who will decline to buy the English version 
sold under the control of the copyright holder and will instead buy 
the Mandarin version sold at a competitive price free of copyright 
restraints. 
So we might say that the Mandarin version adds value and hence 
the translation qualifies as fair use. That misses the key point that the 
author could do the translation herself and, through her control over 
original access to the work, controls the timing of that translation and 
holds that control with or without a copyright over the translated 
work. We should care about her decision about whether to make the 
second-stage investment and that has little—maybe nothing—to do 
whether the second work is a complement or substitute for the first 
work. 
The translation example is a natural starting point, as this is 
where U.S. copyright law started its march towards adding control 
over derivative works to the rights held by the copyright holder. The 
1870 Copyright Act authorized authors to reserve the rights to 
dramatize or translate their own works.20 The familiar “all rights 
reserved” legend became a standard way for authors to hang onto the 
                                                 
19 See Tim Wu in Bits Debate: Mixing It Up Over Remixes and Fair Use, NY Times 
Bits Blog, Jan 16 2008 (online at http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/830/) (visited 
Mar 3, 2008) (“… [W]ork that adds to the value of the original, as opposed to substituting 
for the original, is fair use”). 
20 16 Stat 212 (1870). 
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rights available to them under the statute. We might say that 
translation is just fancy copying. Indeed, it isn’t hard to imagine a 
Xerox 2020 copier offering “language shifting” as one its key selling 
points—“Now with improved Mandarin!”—and that would seem 
just like old-fashioned copying. But the incremental investment point 
is broader and the real question is how much of the derivative works 
right now in Section 106(2) should be brought within that 
framework. 
V .  F a i r  Us e  a s  I n e f f i c i e n t  Bu n d l i n g  
Finally, consider the way that fair use may operate as an inefficient 
bundle of rights. Try this example. We have a book published on 
paper. All consumers value the paper copy of the book at $8. Some 
consumers are happy as clams with just paper. Other consumers 
would love to have a digital, searchable copy of the book to go along 
with the paper copy. Those consumers would value bundle of a paper 
copy and a digital copy at $12. If the copyright owner didn’t fear 
copying—either of the physical book or a digital copy—what would 
she do? 
The answer is straightforward: sell physical copies of the book for 
$8 and digital copies for $4 (or for the proverbial epsilon less than 
that if you like). Old-school consumers would just buy the physical 
copies, newbies would buy both. We would sell to all consumers, and 
the copyright holder would capture all of the value associated with 
the work. We would also not leave any social value sitting on table. 
No transactions that we would like to see take place will have been 
missed. 
Now consider a possible fair use doctrine. Suppose that we 
announced a doctrine that said that any consumer was entitled to the 
work in any medium, once the work was purchased in some 
medium.21 A digital copy is produced—perhaps through an online 
                                                 
21 See eg DigitalConsumer.org’s Bill of Rights (online at 
http://digitalconsumer.org/bill.html) (visited Mar 3 2008). 
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open source-type process where individuals contribute chunks of 
typed text. Consumers who wanted the digital copy would no longer 
need to pay $4 to get it. Where would this put our copyright holder? 
Before the copyright holder could sell different products to 
different consumers. The sensible approach was to sell just paper 
copies to the dinosaurs and sell paper and digital copies to the 
younger consumers. Now the rights regime makes it such that the 
copyright holder can sell only one product, but some of those 
consumers will value the product at $8, while other consumers will 
value the product at $12 (knowing that once they have the paper 
product, they can get a digital product they will value at $4 for free). 
What will the copyright holder do? She can sell the paper copy 
for $8 or the paper copy for $12, but she can no longer sell any 
digital copies for a positive price. What she will do depends on the 
numbers (and to simplify matters, treat the costs of making physical 
and digital copies as being 0). If the copyright holder sets a price of 
$8 for the physical book, she receives revenues of 8*(O + N), where 
O is the number of old-school consumers and N is the number of 
digerati. If instead she sets a price of 12, her revenues are 12*N. 
Try an example. Set N = 10 and O = 4. Total revenues from 
selling at $8 are then $112, from selling at $12, $120. In the face of 
free digital copies—whether from the open-source text collective or 
from a service like Google Book Search—the copyright holder will 
jack up the price of the physical book. She can no longer treat the 
two customer types differently. Note that the copyright holder is 
much worse off than before. Without the free digital copies, on these 
numbers, the copyright holder sold to everyone and took in revenues 
of $152. But, and this is the important point, society is much worse 
off too. All consumers were served before. Now the increased price 
for the physical book—caused by the inability to charge separately for 
the physical book and the digital book—has priced some consumers 
out of the market. 
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Fair use is a form of bundling: one right necessarily comes with 
some other right. Not all consumers will want the “extra” bundled 
rights. Copyright holders will take into account in their initial pricing 
decisions for a work the full uses being conveyed, including those 
conveyed as a result of fair use. With that idea in mind, step back to 
consider two quick points. First, I think that this exactly the dynamic 
at stake for the record legends in Whiteman. If a sold record 
automatically came with a broadcast right, we run the risk of 
inefficient bundling. I take it that we think that the history suggests 
that there was more money to be made in selling many records at low 
prices rather than just a few at high prices to the broadcasters, but it 
could have worked out otherwise. Second, if we ask where that might 
have happened, we might want to consider the emergence of the 
public performance right in 1856.22 This again is a use bundling 
question: if I sell you a copy of the play, do I also sell you right to 
perform the play? Reading the playing and performing it are two 
quite different uses that might arise from the same physical 
instantiation of the work. The 1856 act facilitated separation of these 
markets. 
C o n c l u s i o n  
Use of a copyrighted work and access to it are different animals. U.S. 
copyright law focuses almost exclusively on use rights and doesn’t 
create general positive access rights. Of course, use rights will 
nonetheless be effective if authors choose to give access to works 
through wide distribution of those works through publication. But 
even with publication, authors want to exercise control at a distance 
over the work, to publish the work and yet retain control over it. In 
the past authors have attempted to do so using legends and contracts; 
now authors seek control at a distance through digital rights 
technology. While effective legends, contracts and DRM could limit 
the way in which fair use operates, these limiting tools do no more 
                                                 
22 11 Stat 138 (1856). 
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than implement the author’s fundamental right to control access to 
the work, a right that fair use just doesn’t address. 
If we turn to functional accounts for nonconsensual use of 
copyrighted works—uses such as fair use and uses outside the scope 
of the derivative works right—we need to take into account how 
copyright influences incremental investments in works and how fair 
use can inefficiently bundle together too many uses. The author’s 
initial control over access to a new work means that the author could 
enter many markets for the work simultaneously, so the author could 
produce both an English version of a work and a Mandarin version at 
the same time. An author might have incentive to do this if, for 
example, anyone could produce the Mandarin version once the 
English version was published. We don’t want authors to do this. As 
a society, we want to continue to invest in the copyrighted work only 
after we received market feedback on the English version. Otherwise 
we throw away the information that should guide our incremental 
investments in the work. Copyright designs that limit nonconsensual 
follow-on uses do a better job of aligning incremental investment 
incentives. 
Finally, fair use can operate as a bundling of rights. If we were to 
conclude that the sale of a text copy of a play came with, as fair use, 
the right to perform the play, playwrights would not be able to 
separate the reading and performing markets. Instead of selling at 
different prices to both markets, playwrights might choose to drop 
one market—probably the reading market—to instead sell at high 
prices to the performing market. Consumers would be worse off a 
result. Of course, the 1856 amendments to our copyright statutes 
made exactly this separation possible, but the way in which fair use 
might prevent this type of rights separation in other markets is 
perfectly general. 
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